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Non-technical Summary
Distinct settings of labor market institutions like the employment protection or the unem-
ployment benefit system have attracted considerable attention as a potential explanation for
differences in the unemployment rates of industrialized countries over the last two decades. A
plethora of theoretical and empirical studies have dealt with the identification and quantifica-
tion of direct labor market effects of institutional reforms. However, while theory predicts that
the interplay between individual labor market institutions is as well important to determine the
impact of institutional reforms, empirical studies have widely neglected such interdependencies
so far.
The main problem in empirical studies is that macroeconomic labor market models quickly
become very large if interactions are taken into account. Hence, the estimation of a model
considering a set of institutional interactions requires either exact and comprehensive theoretical
predictions on which interactions to include or a large number of observations to receive reliable
results. Unfortunately, theoretical studies mainly focus on broad concepts of institutions like
the bargaining power or the firing costs, and empirical data-based models cannot be directly
derived from theory. The low number of available observations requires the subjective selection
of some interactions, what is also not an appropriate solution because neglecting potentially
relevant information can severely bias the outcomes.
In this study, I use a bayesian model averaging framework to estimate reliable parameters
for all available bivariate interaction terms. Using data on 14 institutional indicators of 5 insti-
tutional categories (product market regulation, employment protection, unemployment benefit
system, labor tax system, bargaining system), 91 bivariate interactions are analyzed concern-
ing the question whether these interactions can significantly contribute to the explanation of
unemployment.
On the basis of the model averaging approach, I identify 22 robust and significant bi-
variate interaction terms. The empirical evidence emphasizes the importance of institutional
interactions for the determination of unemployment. More concretely, taking interactions into
account significantly improves the explanatory power of the empirical model. The calculation
of country-specific marginal effects of institutions sheds light on the question why institutional
reforms might result in different outcomes in different countries in terms of unemployment. Fur-
thermore, the results can give advice how reform-packages implemented to tackle labor market
rigidities should be designed in order to decrease unemployment.
Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
Arbeitsmarktinstitutionen wie der Ku¨ndigungsschutz oder das System der Arbeitslosenun-
terstu¨tzung sind in den vergangenen zwei Jahrzehnten ha¨ufig als Erkla¨rungsfaktor fu¨r erhebliche
Unterschiede in den Arbeitslosenquoten von Industriela¨nder herangezogen worden. Zahlreiche
theoretische wie empirische Studien haben dabei die Identifikation sowie die Quanitifzierung
der Arbeitsmarkteffekte von institutionellen Reformen zum Ziel gehabt. Obwohl sich aus der
Theorie ableiten la¨sst, dass Wechselwirkungen zwischen verschiedenen Arbeitsmarktinstitu-
tionen ebenfalls bedeutsam sind, wurden diese in empirischen Studien bisher weitestgehend
vernachla¨ssigt.
Das zentrale Problem empirischer Studien ist, dass makroo¨konomische Arbeitsmarktmod-
elle schnell sehr groß werden, sobald Interaktionen Beru¨cksichtigung finden. Die Scha¨tzung
eines Modells mit einer Reihe von Interaktionen aus Institutionen erfordert entweder genaue und
umfassende theoretische Vorhersagen daru¨ber, welche Interaktionen bedeutsam sind, oder eine
große Anzahl an Beobachtungen, um zuverla¨ssige Resultate zu erhalten. Da theoretische Stu-
dien hauptsa¨chlich breite institutionelle Konzepte wie zum Beispiel die Verhandlungsmacht oder
Ku¨ndigungskosten nutzen, kann keine direkte Umsetzung in ein empirisches datengestu¨tztes
Modell erfolgen. Zudem stehen nur relativ wenige Beobachtungen zur Verfu¨gung, weshalb
eine subjektive Beschra¨nkung auf wenige Interaktionen erforderlich ist, was die Ermittlung
verla¨sslicher Scha¨tzergebnisse verhindert.
In dieser Studie wird ein bayesianischer model averaging Ansatz genutzt, um verla¨ssliche
Parameter fu¨r alle verfu¨gbaren bivariaten Interaktionsterme zu scha¨tzen. Mit Hilfe von 14
institutionellen Indikatoren, die 5 Gruppen (Produktmarktregulation, Ku¨ndigungsschutz, Sys-
tem der Arbeitslosenunterstu¨tzung, Arbeitsbesteuerungssystem, Lohnverhandlungssystem) zu-
geordnet werden ko¨nnen, werden 91 bivariate Interaktionen darauf untersucht, ob sie signifikant
zur Erkla¨rung der Arbeitslosigkeit beitragen.
Insgesamt werden 22 Interaktionsterme als signifikant identifiziert. Die empirischen Ergeb-
nisse unterstreichen die Relevanz von Interaktionen als Bestimmungsfaktor der Arbeitslosigkeit.
Mit anderen Worten kann die Beru¨cksichtigung von Interaktionen den Erkla¨rungsgehalt von Ar-
beitsmarktmodellen fu¨r die Arbeitslosigkeit signifikant erho¨hen. Die Berechnung von marginalen
institutionellen Effekten tra¨gt zur Beantwortung der Frage bei, warum institutionelle Reformen
in verschiedenen La¨ndern abweichende Einflu¨sse auf die Arbeitslosigkeit hervorrufen. Zudem
helfen die Ergebnisse zu verstehen, wie Arbeitsmarktreformen ausgestaltet sein sollten, um den
Arbeitsmarkt positiv zu beeinflussen.
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Abstract
Isolated effects of labor and product market institutions as well as the interaction be-
tween both aforementioned categories on unemployment have been extensively discussed
in the empirical literature. However, interaction effects between individual labor market
institutions have been widely neglected, mainly due to the infeasibility to correctly specify
the model. In this paper, a model averaging approach is adopted to show that considering
institutional interactions can improve the explanatory power of macroeconomic models
explaining unemployment. The approach permits to tackle model specification problems
directly related to the inclusion of a large number of interactions. Using a panel data
set for 17 OECD countries from 1982 to 2005, 22 robust and significant interactions can
be identified. Furthermore, country-specific marginal effects of institutional changes are
calculated and their economic significance is analyzed for selected countries.
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1 Introduction
The direct influence of labor market regulations on unemployment has been predicted in several
theoretical models and confirmed in a number of empirical contributions. However, the inter-
play between individual labor market institutions has been widely neglected in the empirical
literature, mainly due to the infeasibility to correctly specify the econometric model. The main
problem is that if interactions are taken into account, the empirical model quickly becomes
very large. In this paper, a model averaging approach is applied to overcome the problem of
model mis-specification. The method helps to reasonably test a large number of interactions
for significance, to show that taking interactions into account improves the explanatory power
of the empirical model, and to deliver evidence on the functioning and performance of different
institutional systems.
Several attempts have been made to capture direct and indirect effects of institutions on
the labor market. Concerning direct effects, Saint-Paul (2004) and Nickell and Layard
(1999) provide an overview on theoretical mechanisms while Nickell et al. (2005) and
Baccaro and Rei (2007) are examples for empirical studies. Similarly, the interdependence
of product and labor market regulation and its impact on the labor market has been found to
be of significance by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and Griffith et al. (2007), for
instance. The dependence of macroeconomic shocks from labor market institutions and their
joint effect on unemployment has also been analyzed by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000)
and Nickell et al. (2005), though there seems to be no interdependence. Furthermore, the
interplay between labor and financial market institutions was a central aspect of the studies by
Wasmer and Weil (2004) or Gatti et al. (2010).
Interactions between individual labor market institutions have also been examined in a
few studies. Belot and van Ours (2001, 2004) use a right-to-manage model to construct
testable hypotheses for the empirical analysis. More specifically, they test interactions between
the tax rate and the replacement rate, and the bargaining centralization with both the union
density and the employment protection. They find that, depending on the particular specifica-
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tion, all considered interactions contribute significantly to the explanation of unemployment.
However, although the theoretical model predicted further interactions, the authors refrained
from estimating them due to data limitations. The IMF (2003) estimated 4 variants of such
unemployment equations, all of them including up to 7 interactions between several institu-
tions. Nevertheless, the model specifications have been carried out on an ad-hoc basis, so that
the results are probably sensitive to robustness checks.
Bassanini and Duval (2006) as well as Baccaro and Rei (2007) also estimated
several institutional interactions. As mentioned by the authors, the results seem to be rather
sensitive to the inclusion of further interactions and to the specific estimation strategy. Fur-
thermore, both studies point out that the estimation of such a complex interaction network,
i.e. a large set of institutional interactions, requires either exact and comprehensive theoretical
predictions regarding institutional interactions or much more observations to receive reliable
results. The main problem with interaction terms is that even if only a small number of in-
stitutional indicators is considered, the number of possible interactions is substantially larger.
For instance, including 8 institutional indicators sums up to 8∗7
2
= 28 interactions. Bassanini
and Duval (2009) therefore concentrate on interactions between single institutions and the
institutional framework as a whole. The results point to reform complementarities between
labor market institutions as predicted by Coe and Snower (1997) without saying anything
about interactions between individual institutions.
It can be learned from this brief literature overview that the empirical estimation of several
institutional interactions requires the inclusion of a large number of interaction terms. Since
empirical macroeconomic models are restricted in terms of number of observations, either a
limited number of theoretically established interaction terms or an adequate estimation strat-
egy to deal with a large number of interactions is required. Although the theoretical literature
gives some guidance on the interplay of some specific labor market institutions like, for instance,
Blanchard and Tirole (2008) or Boeri et al. (2003) on unemployment benefits and
employment protection, or Daveri and Tabellini (2000) on labor taxes and bargaining
power, a comprehensive theoretical model describing the interplay of more than just two in-
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stitutions and providing clear predictions on significant interactions is missing. An exception
is Coe and Snower (1997). Indeed, 5 different labor market policy fields are considered in
their model. But the assumptions concerning the effects of deregulating reforms are simplified
in a sense that deregulation is generally beneficial. This does not reflect the advances of the
literature which draws a more complex picture of the functioning of labor market institutions.
In this study, I use a model averaging framework to estimate reliable parameters for all
bivariate interaction terms which are robust to alterations of the model specification. Using
data on 14 institutional indicators of 5 institutional categories (product market regulation, em-
ployment protection, unemployment benefit system, labor tax system, bargaining system), 91
bivariate interactions are analyzed concerning the question whether these interactions can con-
tribute to the explanation of unemployment. While the focus is on labor market institutions,
two indicators for the product market regulation are included as well to avoid neglecting poten-
tially relevant information. The study is centered on comprehensively available annual data on
17 OECD countries for the period from 1982 to 2005. The method applied has been developed
by Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) (BACE - Bayesian Averaging with Classical Estimates)
and has been formally extended to a panel by Moral-Benito (2010). The central idea is
to estimate a large set of models containing a varying number of explanatory variables taken
from the pool of all variables. The quality of a model j serves as a weighting coefficient for the
variables kj included in model j. Thus, variables which are incorporated in models with better
fit receive higher weighting than variables in models that exhibit smaller explanatory power.
The weights of a variable over all models are summed up and serve as a measure for evaluating
the importance of the factor in explaining the dependent variable.
On the basis of the model averaging approach, I identify 22 robust and significant bi-
variate interaction terms. The empirical evidence emphasizes the importance of institutional
interactions for the determination of unemployment. More concretely, taking interactions into
account significantly improves the explanatory power of the empirical model. The calculation
of country-specific marginal effects of institutions sheds light on the question why institutional
reforms might result in different outcomes in different countries in terms of unemployment.
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Furthermore, the results give advice how reform-packages implemented to tackle labor market
rigidities should be designed to decrease unemployment.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly explains the empirical strategy and
introduces the BACE approach. Section 3 gives an overview on the data and data construction
methods. In section 4, robust and significant interactions are identified on the basis of the model
averaging approach. In section 5, marginal effects for institutional changes are calculated and
country-specific labor market effects of institutional reforms are presented for different countries.
Furthermore, the economic significance of the institutional interactions is discussed. Finally,
section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical Strategy
The basic empirical model is
UEi,t = αi + λt + Interactionsi,t + Insti,t + Controlsi,t + εi,t (1)
where UEi,t represents the actual unemployment rate, αi and λt are time- and country-
specific effects, Insti,t are 14 individual institutional indicators, and Controlsi,t are 4 macroe-
conomic shocks as well as an indicator for the constraints to credit access. This factor appeared
to be of importance in, for instance, Dromel et al. (2010). The factors of interest are con-
tained in the vector Interactionsi,t. The model averaging approach applied in this paper enables
to assess whether the variation of the set of explanatory variables changes the results of the
variables under inspection. Here, the variables under inspection are 91 bivariate interactions.
The variation comes therefore from building different combinations of interaction terms, and
to look whether the significance of the variables of interest changes when the set of interactions
(as explanatory variables) is altered. Note that the control variables and the 14 individual in-
stitutions appear in all regressions. The inclusion of the 14 institutional variables is necessary
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since these factors are the constitutive terms of the interactions. According to Brambor et
al. (2006), the inclusion of all constitutive terms is obligatory when estimating interaction
models. The model averaging approach is explained in greater detail in the following section.
2.1 Bayesian Model Averaging
Model mis-specification can lead to severely biased results, mainly due to omitted variable
bias, especially if theory does not provide a clear guide on which variables and interactions to
include. For instance, according to an example provided by Bassanini and Duval (2006),
the impact of the labor taxation might be independent of minimum wages. If, however, min-
imum wages are correlated with the bargaining power, and the labor taxes at the same time
interact with the bargaining power, then the exclusion of the interaction between labor taxes
and the bargaining power causes the interaction between labor taxes and minimum wages to
be significant. However, there are a lot of potentially interacting factors and including all of
them jointly in one model is infeasible due to limitations in terms of degrees of freedom. One
possible solution to this problem is to avoid specifying a particular model. Rather, this model
uncertainty is particularly taken into account by exploiting information of a large number of
models. A particular model consists of the fixed regressors plus a random number of varying
regressors like, for instance, institutional interactions. First, P (Mj|y) is the weight of a model
j in relation to the sum of the weights of all possible models. It is calculated as
P (Mj|y) =
P (Mj)NT
−kj/2SSE−NT/2j∑2K
i=1 P (Mi)NT
−ki/2SSE−NT/2i
. (2)
The term SSE considers the sum of squared errors of a regression to account for the quality
of a model, and is corrected for degrees of freedom according to the Schwartz model selection
criterion. N is the number of cross-sections, i.e. countries, T is the number of time periods,
K is the total number of explanatory factors, and ki and kj are the number of explanatory
variables in the particular models i and j. Note that the explanatory factors comprise only
those which are varied conditional on the particular model, and not the variables which are
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held fix in all estimations. Hence, given the basic empirical model of equation (1), only the
interaction terms are variable while the individual institutional indicators as well as the shock
terms are held fix. The sum of the weights P (Mj|y) over all models a variable appears in gives
the posterior inclusion probability of this variable.
Furthermore, P (Mj) is the prior model probability related to model j. This probability is
calculated as
P (Mj) =
(
k
K
)kj (
1− k
K
)K−kj
. (3)
In other words, P (Mj) is a weighting factor to correct for the model size, i.e. for the number of
explanatory variables with k being the prior model size. This term expresses the researcher’s
belief about the true model size, i.e. the true number of interaction terms in the model, before
seeing the data. The prior model size is crucial for the determination of the prior inclusion
probability. This probability is calculated as k
K
, i.e. the prior model size divided by the total
number of explanatory factors which are varied. Models with a size close to the prior model size
is given a higher weight. In doing so, I correct for the fact, that models with a large number of
explanatory variables per se achieve a better fit than models with only few explanatory factors.1
3 Data
Annual data on 14 institutional indicators has been gathered for 5 institutional categories;
the labor tax system, the employment protection legislation, the wage bargaining system, the
product market regulation, and the unemployment benefit system. Each category comprises
some indicators which capture a part of the particular institutional class. The bayesian model
averaging approach applied in this paper requires to use a completely balanced data-set. Hence,
the time period is restricted to 1982 to 2005, and the country sample includes 17 OECD
countries.2 Data availability constraints are also the reason for not considering alternative
1For a detailed description of the method I refer to Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004).
2The countries involved are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United
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institutional categories like, for instance, migration policy, family policy, or the retirement
system.
Additionally, control variables are taken into account to capture short-run fluctuations of
the unemployment rate which can not be traced back to institutional rigidities. I generally
follow Nickell et al. (2005) in constructing 4 shock variables, a labor demand shock, an
import price shock, a total factor productivity shock, and the real interest rate. All variables
which are used in the estimations are described in greater detail in the following.
3.1 Institutions
The labor tax system is characterized by the payroll tax (TX1), the income tax (TX2), and
the consumption tax (TX3). They have been constructed according to the definition given
in Nickell and Nunziata (2001). The payroll tax is TX1 = ess
ie−ess with ess being the
employers’ social security contributions and ie equal to the compensation of employees. The
incomes tax is calculated as TX2 = it
hcr
where it is the direct tax spending and hcr the
household’s current receipts. The consumption tax is TX3 = tls
fce
whit tls being the taxes less
subsidies on products and imports, while fce is the households’ final consumption expenditure.
The indicators have been recalculated and some changes to the original series in Nickell and
Nunziata (2001) exist, probably due to data revisions.
The employment protection legislation is covered by protection for regular (EPL1), and
for temporary employment (EPL2). According to the OECD, the former index consists of
information on procedural inconveniences for the employer when executing a dismissal, on
notice periods and severance payments, and on further impediments which can complicate
the execution of a dismissal. The latter index captures information on the relevance of fixed-
term contracts compared to permanent contracts by including several dimensions of fixed-term
contracts, and on the regulation of temporary work agencies. Both indices have a range from 0
to 6 where the value increases with the strictness of employment protection. Both series have
been delivered by the OECD.
States. Further OECD countries like Ireland or South Korea had to be excluded due to some missing data.
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The bargaining system is represented by an index for the bargaining coordination (BCO),
an index for the minimum wage setting (MW), and the union coverage (UC). The bargaining
coordination index reaches from 1 to 5 where 1 indicates fragmented bargaining at the company
level, and 5 economy-wide bargaining. The minimum wage index has a range from 1 to 8 with
1 for no minimum wage and 8 for a national minimum wage set by the government. The
union coverage is the share of employees whose wage bargaining is affected by wage bargaining
agreements. Note that the 2 additional variables, the bargaining centralization and the union
density, have not been considered in this paper due to the high correlation with the bargaining
coordination and the union coverage, respectively. All information on the bargaining system
comes from the Visser database (see Visser 2009).
The OECD provides information on product market regulation, as well. The ECTR database
contains regulation indicators in energy, transport and communication sectors. The aggregate
values for the entry barriers (EB) and the public ownership (POS) are considered in the em-
pirical section. Both indices range from 0 to 6 where the value increases with the regulation of
competition. I refer to Conway and Nicoletti (2006) for a more detailed description.
Finally, the approach to construct indicators for the unemployment benefit system has
been taken from Nickell (2006). The unemployment benefits show the transfer payments
during a period of unemployment, averaged over different family and income situations as a
fraction of the last income. Detailed information on these situations can be found in OECD
(1994), chapter 8. The first year benefits (UB1) capture the transfer payments during the
first year of unemployment. Similarly, the second and third year benefits (UB2) show the
transfer payments averaged over the second and third year of unemployment, and the fourth
and fifth year benefits (UB3) refer to the fourth and fifth year of unemployment. Note that
the tax benefit models provided by the OECD have to be used for updating. Unfortunately,
the tax benefit models provide data on unemployment benefits which are incorrect for some
countries. The particular time series have to be checked and adjusted according to the country-
specific definitions available at the OECD, benefits and wages homepage. Information on the
coverage of the unemployment benefit system (UBC) is delivered by the Fondazione Rodolfo
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de Benedetti. The indicator is calculated as the fraction of job-seekers entitled to benefits over
the total number of job-seekers. Observations are missing for Belgium (2000-2005), Italy (1982-
1989 and 2003-2005), Sweden (1982-1994), Switzerland (1982-1984) and the United Kingdom
(1996). In these cases the value for the first preceding or successive valid observation is taken
for the missing observation. If both a proceeding and successive valid observation is available,
the mean is taken.
3.2 Macroeconomic variables
The dependent variable is the harmonized unemployment rate taken from the OECD. Some
data is missing for earlier periods for some countries. To ensure consistent time series, I calculate
the growth rates of the unemployment rate as a percentage of civilian labor force (which is not
harmonized) and extend the harmonized unemployment rates by concatenating the change of
the country-specific unemployment rate. Only Austria from 1982 to 1992, Germany from 1982
to 1990 and Switzerland from 1982 to 1991 are affected by this adjustment.
The labor demand shock is the change in the residuals of a labor demand model which is
ln(TEt) = β0 + β1ln(TEt−1) + β2ln(TEt−2) + β3ln(TEt−3) + β4ln(Yt) + β5ln(LCt) + εt. (4)
TE is total employment, Y is the real GDP and LC are the real labor costs per employee.
The real labor costs are calculated as the total labor costs of the total economy divided by the
number of dependently employed workers. The real import price is the import price deflator
divided by the GDP deflator. The shock is then the log change in the real import price times
the import share in GDP. The real interest rate is the long-term interest rate minus the current
inflation rate. The factor productivity shock has been constructed according to Bassanini and
Duval (2006). First, the change in the log of TFP is calculated as
∆ln(TFP ) =
∆ln(Y )− α∆ln(TE) + (1− α)∆ln(K)
α
(5)
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with Y equal to the GDP in the business sector, TE is total employment, K the gross capital
stock, and α the share of labor income in total business sector income. A value for the annual
TFP is constructed by cumulating the changes in the log TFP’s over years. Finally, I take the
deviations from the TFP trend to construct an index for TFP shocks by applying the Hodrick-
Prescott filter with a λ of 100. A money supply shock as in Nickell et al. (2005) could not
be constructed due to missing data. Nevertheless, the results in Nickell et al. indicate at most
only slight importance of that shock. For the credit constraints I use data from Beck and
Demirg-Kunt (2009). More specifically, the indicator for private credit by deposit money
banks and other financial institutions over GDP is used.
4 Identification of robust and significant institutional in-
teractions
Model averaging enables the researcher to avoid a subjective decision on which variables to
include in a model. Nevertheless, the number of explanatory variables is limited by the data
availability. Only such interactions can be considered for which data is comprehensively avail-
able. Hence, 91 bivariate interaction terms are tested for significance within the bayesian model
averaging approach.3
As explained in section 2, the BACE approach requires the determination of the prior model
size from the researcher. In the following, different prior model sizes are used to evaluate the
significance and robustness of the institutional interactions. The prior model sizes are set to
values of 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50, what leads to prior inclusion probabilities of 0.11, 0.22, 0.33,
0.44, and 0.55.4 Generally, an interaction term with a posterior inclusion probability above
3Braumoeller (2004) states that once a model with more than one interaction is specified, attention has
to be paid to implicit interactions. For the interaction models considered in this paper it would be necessary to
include a full set of
∑n
k=1
(
n
k
)
interactions where n is the number of institutional indicators. Besides the bivariate
interactions, higher-order interactions should therefore also be considered. Unfortunately, this would require
the inclusion and interpretation of 16383 interactions. Obviously, this is infeasible and the problem of implicit
interactions cannot be taken into account. The opportunity to gain information on bivariate interactions comes
at the price of a possible bias due to the negligence of implicit interactions.
4This is calculated as prior model sizenumber of institutional interactions .
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the corresponding prior inclusion probability is considered as significant dependent on the prior
model size. Note, that the alteration of the prior model size is done to check the robustness of
the outcomes. Therefore, an interaction term is only called robust and significant if its posterior
inclusion probability is above the corresponding prior inclusion probability for all considered
prior model sizes. The results are displayed in table 1 where the variables are sorted according
to their posterior inclusion probability for a prior model size of 30 in a descending order. Only
interaction terms which are significant for at least one prior model size specification are reported
in order to avoid illegible tables.
The findings attach a significant effect on the unemployment rate to 22 interaction terms
independent of the prior model size. Further 13 interaction terms have posterior inclusion
probabilities above the prior inclusion probabilities for some prior model sizes, but not for all.
Hence, these 13 interactions are not called significant.
The technical procedure of estimating posterior inclusion probabilities with a large number
of explanatory factors can lead to slightly changing results for two runs with the same spec-
ification. While this is not relevant for most of the interactions, it can be of importance for
variables with a posterior inclusion probability around the prior inclusion probability. Hence,
the results have been generated twice for each prior model size to secure that the decision of
significance is not driven by a slightly imprecise convergence process. While for few variables
the results indeed change for some prior model sizes, the overall findings on significance and
robustness remain unchanged. Hence, the 22 robust and significant interaction terms identified
in this section build therefore the basis for the further analysis.
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Table 1: Different prior model sizes, availability
Variable
Model size k = 10 k = 15 k = 20 k = 25 k = 30 k = 40
Prior incl. prob. (0.11) (0.16) (0.22) (0.27) (0.33) (0.44)
EPL2*UB2 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
TX1*MW 0.995 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
EB*POS 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
EPL2*UB3 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
TX1*TX2 0.992 0.997 0.998 0.999 0.999 0.999
UC*EB 0.884 0.983 0.996 0.999 0.999 0.999
TX2*MW 0.994 0.998 0.999 0.999 0.990 0.998
TX1*UB3 0.998 0.982 0.998 0.998 0.997 0.997
EPL1*UC 0.999 0.996 0.998 0.998 0.996 0.999
EPL1*UB1 0.887 0.918 0.969 0.982 0.985 0.997
BCO*UC 0.986 0.984 0.976 0.982 0.974 0.989
EPL2*MW 0.961 0.975 0.987 0.977 0.974 0.981
TX3*MW 0.608 0.882 0.928 0.970 0.955 0.987
TX1*UB2 0.829 0.818 0.926 0.963 0.965 0.970
MW*EB 0.696 0.900 0.892 0.904 0.945 0.950
TX3*EB 0.594 0.676 0.745 0.868 0.832 0.866
TX3*UB2 0.750 0.884 0.883 0.727 0.943 0.764
TX1*POS 0.460 0.595 0.646 0.576 0.838 0.822
POS*UB3 0.402 0.370 0.437 0.571 0.393 0.491
UC*POS 0.116 0.342 0.456 0.454 0.696 0.640
EPL1*EPL2 0.450 0.540 0.517 0.417 0.524 0.479
EPL1*EB 0.194 0.337 0.338 0.314 0.413 0.443
UC*UB1 0.109 0.107 0.228 0.392 0.301 0.634
TX3*UC 0.217 0.455 0.467 0.379 0.541 0.408
BCO*UB3 0.186 0.272 0.334 0.363 0.379 0.388
EPL1*UBC 0.105 0.358 0.336 0.355 0.471 0.400
EPL1*MW 0.202 0.339 0.344 0.333 0.425 0.404
UC*UB2 0.283 0.138 0.154 0.306 0.113 0.292
UB2*UB3 0.034 0.038 0.077 0.297 0.122 0.352
EPL1*UB3 0.142 0.135 0.172 0.183 0.264 0.356
BCO*UBC 0.226 0.298 0.227 0.164 0.181 0.212
EPL2*BCO 0.189 0.166 0.186 0.158 0.271 0.188
TX3*POS 0.172 0.172 0.185 0.124 0.180 0.175
EB*UB3 0.145 0.142 0.118 0.114 0.189 0.321
EPL2*EB 0.124 0.088 0.095 0.071 0.085 0.093
The dependent variable is the unemployment rate. The 5 control variables as well as the 14 institutional indicators have been
included in all regressions. Overall, models consisting of combinations of up to 91 interaction terms have been considered. Fixed
country- and time-specific effects are swept by using the Within transformation (see Baltagi 2003). Only variables with a posterior
inclusion probability above the prior inclusion probability for at least one prior model size specification are displayed in the table.
Prior incl. prob. is the prior inclusion probability.
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4.1 Do interactions really help to explain unemployment?
The model averaging approach applied in this paper helps to evaluate whether bivariate inter-
actions of institutional indicators are robustly and significantly related to the unemployment
rate. But does the inclusion of interacting variables really boost the explanatory power of
macroeconomic unemployment models? In other words, does the model including interactions
perform substantially better in explaining unemployment than the benchmark model without
interactions? A comparison between both models gives an indication of the importance of in-
teractions between individual institutional indicators. Table 2 displays the outcomes of fixed
effects-regressions with the unemployment rate as the left-hand variable.
The first model includes the 14 individual institutional indicators and the 5 control vari-
ables. The second model adds the 22 institutional interactions identified as robust and signifi-
cant within the model averaging framework. Due to space constraints, the 5 control variables as
well as the unemployment benefit coverage are not displayed. Two results stand out. First, the
model fit of the interaction model (model 2), measured by the adjusted R-squared, is substan-
tially better than the model fit of model 1. Second, all interaction terms show significance at
least at the 5%-level, except for the interaction between the employment protection for regular
and for temporary employment (EPL1 ∗ EPL2) which is only significant at the 10%-level.
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Table 2: Model comparison without and with interactions
Explanatory variables Coefficient
Standard
error
Coefficient
Standard
error
Model 1 Model 2
Payroll tax (TX1) 0.02517*** (0.00362) -0.02256** (0.01098)
Income tax (TX2) 0.01458** (0.00598) -0.01234 (0.00801)
Consumption tax (TX3) -0.02978*** (0.00476) -0.00397 (0.00628)
Employment protection regular (EPL1) 0.09814** (0.04254) 1.16299*** (0.17362)
Employment protection temp (EPL2) -0.09648*** (0.01480) -0.20253*** (0.05899)
Bargaining coordination (BCO) -0.04360*** (0.01131) -0.17733*** (0.03164)
Minimum wage (MW) 0.00606 (0.00729) -0.06583 (0.03455)
Union coverage (UC) 0.00637*** (0.00167) 0.00867 (0.00423)
Entry barriers (EB) -0.04389*** (0.01574) 0.05029 (0.04400)
Public ownership (POS) 0.05251** (0.02240) 0.40932*** (0.05646)
First year benefits (UB1) 0.00358 (0.00141) 0.00875*** (0.00247)
Second/third year benefits (UB2) 0.00026 (0.00142) -0.00441** (0.00209)
Fourth/fifth year benefits (UB3) -0.00754*** (0.00131) 0.02084*** (0.00405)
TX1*TX2 - - 0.00370*** (0.00042)
TX1*MW - - -0.00897*** (0.00114)
TX1*POS - - 0.00545*** (0.00171)
TX1*UB2 - - -0.00153*** (0.00013)
TX1*UB3 - - 0.00191*** (0.00013)
TX2*MW - - -0.00527*** (0.00118)
TX3*MW - - 0.00703*** (0.00144)
TX3*EB - - -0.00567*** (0.00097)
TX3*UB2 - - -0.00048*** (0.00009)
EPL1*EPL2 - - -0.02667* (0.02205)
EPL1*UC - - -0.01187*** (0.00178)
EPL1*EB - - -0.02260** (0.01074)
EPL1*UB1 - - -0.00475*** (0.00113)
EPL2*MW - - 0.03272*** (0.00495)
EPL2*UB2 - - 0.00876*** (0.00075)
EPL2*UB3 - - -0.00794*** (0.00104)
BCO*UC - - 0.00203*** (0.00042)
MW*EB - - 0.00906*** (0.00212)
UC*EB - - 0.00336*** (0.00050)
UC*POS - - -0.00285** (0.00088)
EB*POS - - -0.05451*** (0.00620)
POS*UB3 - - -0.00302*** (0.00093)
R-squared 0.533103 0.812871
Adjusted R-squared 0.511499 0.792475
The dependent variable is the unemployment rate. The 5 control variables as well as the unemployment benefit coverage are
included in both models, but not displayed. *** means significance at the 1%, ** at the 5%, and * at the 10%-level.
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4.2 Are the findings in line with the literature?
The econometric analysis deliberately abstracted from using theoretical predictions for the con-
struction of hypotheses. Nevertheless, a brief discussion and classification of the results is given
in dependence on the existing literature. However, comparing the findings of this study with
the previous literature is hindered by the distinct characterization of institutions. While theo-
retical studies refer to concepts like the bargaining power, firing taxes and costs, or the search
intensity of the unemployed, empirical studies need to find appropriate observable measures for
these concepts. For instance, the workers’ bargaining power is usually described by the union
density or union coverage, but could also be captured by minimum wage agreements. Further-
more, there exist several variables at distinct aggregation levels within the same institutional
category. One could use the payroll, the income and the consumption tax, or the sum of all
three factors (the tax wedge) to describe the labor tax system. While the more disaggregated
variables can help to draw a more detailed picture of the impact of institutions, the interpreta-
tion is more difficult, especially when it comes to interactions. The analysis conducted in this
paper uses disaggregated measures, when possible. When theory predicts a connection between,
for example, the unemployment benefits and the employment protection, 6 interaction terms
are affected. Hence, a comparison with the findings of the relevant theoretical and empirical
literature might suffer from the fact, that it is sometimes infeasible to identify comparable
interactions.
For example, Daveri and Tabellini (2000) theoretically predict and empirically confirm
a positive interaction between the labor tax burden and the workers’ bargaining power. The
central idea is that additional costs of increasing labor taxes are distributed between employers
and employees according to the workers’ bargaining power. If the workers have a certain degree
of power, they can shift the costs to the employer. Hence, the bargaining power should interact
with factors that increase costs which are distributed between the employee and the employer.
Hence, the higher the bargaining power, the more detrimental a cost increase, what is equal to
a positive sign of the interaction term. The IMF (2003) was not able to confirm the findings
of Daveri and Tabellini (2000). The signs of the coefficients of the interactions between
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the union density and both the employment protection as well as the tax wedge are negative.
Bassanini and Duval (2009) also find a negative, but insignificant effect of both interactions.
I prefer to use the union coverage (UC) as an indicator for the workers’ bargaining power since
this factor better describes the unions range and power in the wage bargaining. Institutional
changes which can produce additional labor costs are labor taxes as well as firing costs. While
the former is represented by the payroll (TX1), the income (TX2) and the consumption tax
(TX3), the latter is captured by the employment protection for regular as well as for temporary
employment (EPL1 and EPL2). However, only one such interaction (EPL1 ∗UC) appears as
significant, but has the wrong negative sign.
A second type of interaction has been established by Hall and Soskice (2001) and
is based on the variety of capitalism approach. The central argument is that the effect of
labor market institutions varies depending on the type of capitalism. The authors distinguish
between liberal market economies and coordinated market economies. While the former type
can be characterized as a market-driven economy, the latter type is more dependent on informal
coordination of the market activities between the actors. In a nutshell, coordinated economies
are rather able to internalize the negative impacts of institutional characteristics by focusing
on the general, economy-wide consequences. If this hypothesis holds true, the bargaining
coordination (BCO) should interact with other institutional factors. While this is the case for
one interaction (BCO ∗UC), the sign is positive and therefore counterintuitive. An increase in
the workers’ bargaining power has worse consequences on the labor market for a high degree of
coordination compared to a situation with a low level of coordination. This result is opposed
to what has been estimated by Baccaro and Rei (2007) who found a negative coefficient of
the interaction between the union density and the bargaining coordination. Similarly, the IMF
(2003) presents a positive significant coefficient for the same interaction, and Belot and van
Ours (2004) report a negative coefficient for the interaction between the union density and
the bargaining centralization. While the deviation from the common result in the literature
could be caused by the union density replacement by the union coverage, it could also be the
consequence of the comprehensive estimation of all interactions.
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The third type of interaction deals with the interplay between labor demand and supply.
An institutional reform which raises labor demand only affects equilibrium unemployment if
enough labor is supplied. In contrast, a reform fostering labor supply calls for sufficient labor
demand to be effective. An example for this, mentioned by Belot and van Ours (2001),
is a decrease of unemployment benefits which has no effect if not sufficient jobs are provided,
for instance due to high employment protection. Since it is not feasible to disentangle the
particular institutional impacts on labor demand and supply, a simplification conducted and it
is assumed that the unemployment benefits mainly affect labor supply, while the employment
protection, labor taxes, the minimum wage, the bargaining power, and the product market
regulation are expected to shape labor demand. If the sign of the interaction term is negative,
then the reforms are called complementary. In this case, a reduction of an institutional value
is more beneficial if the value of the conditioning variable is low. Given that a high level
of the conditioning variable is actually hindering labor demand, a negative sign is expected
for the interaction terms. Indeed, TX1 ∗ UB2, TX3 ∗ UB2, EPL1 ∗ UB1, EPL2 ∗ UB3,
POS ∗UB3 have the expected sign. In contrast, TX1 ∗UB3 and EPL2 ∗UB2 show a positive
sign. The findings of Bassanini and Duval (2009) concerning this type of interaction as
well do not point to consistently negative interaction term coefficients. While the interaction
between the unemployment benefits and the tax wedge is positive, and negative the one between
the unemployment benefits and the union density, the interactions between the unemployment
benefits and both the employment protection as well as the product market regulation are
insignificant. Similarly, the IMF (2003) reports a negative coefficient for the interaction
between the unemployment benefits and the employment protection, and a positive one for the
interaction between the unemployment benefits and the tax wedge.
5 Conditional effects of institutions
The results of the previous estimations show that each institutional indicator is important as
an interaction partner for some other institution, except for the bargaining coverage (UBC).
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The indicators which appear most frequently as interaction partners are the payroll tax (TX1),
the minimum wage (MW), and the entry barriers (EB) with 5 appearances in interaction
terms. Furthermore, the union coverage (UC) and the public ownership (POS) are included
in 4 interaction terms. The least important interaction partners, given the appearances in
interaction terms, are the bargaining coordination (BCO) and the first year unemployment
benefits (UB1). Form the results presented in table 2, it is generally possible to deduce the
impact of an institutional change on the unemployment rate conditional on other institutional
factors. This will be done in the following.
5.1 Calculating marginal effects
The calculation of marginal effects of institutional changes needs to consider both the direct as
well as the conditional effect. Hence, both the coefficients of the individual indicators of model
2 in the upper part of table 2 as well as the interaction terms coefficients in the lower part of
model 2 of table 2 are required.5 The coefficients of the individual effects show the impact of
the particular variable given that the conditioning variable(s) are zero. This can be seen from
the following equation.
Y = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X1X2 +  (6)
gives an estimation equation with two institutional factors X1 and X2 as well as an interaction
between both factors X1X2. Then, the marginal effect of, for instance, X1 is
∂Y
∂X1
= β1 + β2X2. (7)
β1 gives the effect of X1 for X2 = 0, while β2 shows the dependence of a change in X1 on
X2. Given the equations (6) and (7), the results from table 2 provide enough information to
calculate the marginal effects of changes in all institutional indicators. The marginal effect of an
5Basically, the values for the interaction coefficients could also be calculated within the model averaging
framework. A comparison between the both methods shows minor differences. The results presented in the
following would therefore be marginally affected.
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indicator is calculated from the individual indicator coefficient plus the coefficients estimated
from the interactions in which the particular indicator takes place. For example, the marginal
effect of bargaining coordination (BCO) is
∂UE
∂BCO
= −0.17733 + 0.00203 UC. (8)
Equation (8) implies that the bargaining coordination has a negative impact on unemployment
as long as the union coverage (UC) is zero what is an irrelevant case. For union coverage values
larger than zero the effect becomes less negative or even positive. Obviously, some descriptive
statistics are required to gather more information on the marginal effect of a variable conditional
on the value of another variable. Therefore, table 3 delivers some statistics for the individual
indicators.
According to table 3, the threshold value for union coverage is 0.17733
0.00203
= 87.4, what is within
the range of possible values. The interpretation for this is that for values lower than 87.4
for the union coverage, an increase of the bargaining coordination has a negative impact on
unemployment. For union coverage values above 87.4, the effect of a bargaining coordination
increase on unemployment becomes positive. A closer look at the data reveals that there are
91 observations below 87.4 for the union coverage and 317 above. Hence, whether an increase
in the bargaining coordination has a positive or a negative impact on unemployment is clearly
a country- and time-specific issue. Similar to this, marginal effects can be calculated for all
institutional indicators. However, while the exercise is easy for indicators included in only one
interaction, it is more difficult for indicators that interact with more than one indicator. The
marginal effect of the income tax (TX2), for instance, can be calculated from the direct effect,
and the effects conditional on the minimum wage (MW ) and the payroll tax (TX1). Hence, two
threshold levels have to be calculated. Taking the income tax example, the relevant equation
to calculate the marginal effect of an income tax increase is
∂UE
∂TX2
= −0.01234 + 0.00270 TX1− 0.00527 MW. (9)
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics over all countries and years
Variable Mean Median S.D. Min Max
Payroll tax (TX1) 12.95 13.73 9.36 0.00 32.36
Income tax (TX2) 15.74 15.91 6.64 0.01 33.80
Consumption tax (TX3) 19.34 20.44 6.54 1.61 33.53
Employment protection regular (EPL1) 1.98 1.87 0.85 0.17 3.88
Employment protection temp (EPL2) 2.15 1.88 1.44 0.25 5.38
Bargaining coordination (BCO) 3.19 4.00 1.28 1.00 5.00
Minimum wage (MW) 3.50 2.00 2.86 0.00 8.00
Union coverage (UC) 67.90 75.00 24.84 13.70 99.00
Entry barriers (EB) 3.57 3.81 1.63 0.35 6.00
Public ownership (POS) 3.83 4.08 1.31 0.83 6.00
First year benefits (UB1) 49.08 52.65 20.33 1.00 88.80
Second/third year benefits (UB2) 25.43 25.90 20.19 0.00 68.50
Fourth/fifth year benefits (UB3) 14.10 15.45 13.94 0.00 68.50
The underlying time frame ranges from 1982 to 2005. Averages over all years and all 17 countries have been constructed.
If the minimum wage value was known, it would be feasible to calculate the threshold level
for the payroll tax. Similarly, for a known value of the payroll tax, the threshold level for the
minimum wage could be calculated. The first coefficient again only shows the effect of the
income tax for both the payroll tax and the minimum wage being jointly zero.
In order to tackle this problem, the mean values for all conditioning variables are taken
except of the one conditioning variable of interest. If one is interested, for instance, in the
interaction between the income tax and the minimum wage, the mean value for the payroll tax
over all countries and years is inserted in equation (9). The mean value of the payroll tax is
12.95. Hence, the marginal effect of the income tax (TX2) reduces to
∂UE
∂TX2
= −0.01234 + 0.00270 ∗ 12.95− 0.00527 MW = 0.02263− 0.00527 MW (10)
and the threshold level for the minimum wage is now 0.02263
0.00527
= 4.3.
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Table 4: Calculation of threshold levels
Variable
Conditioning
variable
Individual
coefficient
Interaction
coefficient
Threshold
level
Payroll tax (TX1) TX2 -0.02256 0.00370 10.85
MW -0.00897 5.16
POS 0.00545 3.59
UB2 -0.00153 50.19
UB3 0.00191 -0.47
Income tax (TX2) TX1 -0.01234 0.00370 14.88
MW -0.00527 1.69
Consumption tax (TX3) MW -0.00397 0.00703 4.54
EB -0.00567 2.00
UB2 -0.00048 10.25
Employment protection regular (EPL1) UC 1.16129 -0.01187 77.80
EB -0.02260 8.55
UB1 -0.00475 77.79
EPL2 -0.02667 6.34
Employment protection temp (EPL2) MW -0.20253 0.03272 4.82
UB2 0.00876 30.81
UB3 -0.00794 8.08
UB3 -0.02667 5.35
Bargaining coordination (BCO) UC -0.17733 0.00203 87.35
Minimum wage (MW) EB -0.06583 0.00906 5.17
TX1 -0.00897 11.14
TX2 -0.00527 12.30
TX3 0.00703 21.40
EPL2 0.03272 2.61
Union coverage (UC) EB 0.00867 0.00336 4.30
POS -0.00285 2.50
BCO 0.00203 4.40
EPL1 -0.01187 1.75
Entry barriers (EB) TX3 0.05029 -0.00567 -35.45
EPL1 -0.02260 -9.88
MW 0.00906 31.78
POS -0.05451 -0.96
Public ownership (POS) TX1 0.40932 0.00545 -9.22
UC -0.00285 133.33
EB -0.04077 4.90
UB3 -0.00302 54.19
First year benefits (UB1) EPL1 0.00875 -0.00475 2.07
Second/third year benefits (UB2) TX1 -0.00441 -0.00153 5.52
TX3 -0.00048 11.14
EPL2 0.00876 2.66
Fourth/fifth year benefits (UB3) TX1 0.02084 0.00191 7.32
EPL2 -0.00794 2.89
POS -0.00302 5.52
The table contains the estimated coefficients of model 2, table 3 with the mean values of table 4.
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Since the minimum wage index can only be a natural number from the set MW =
{1, 2, ...., 8}, values of 1,2,3 and 4 assign a positive impact on unemployment to an income
tax increase, while values of 5,6,7, and 8 mean a negative marginal effect of an income tax
reform on unemployment, given that the payroll tax is at its mean.
Table 4 contains the threshold levels for each combination of interaction partners. If there
is more than just one interaction partner, the mean values are taken to calculate the threshold
level for the indicator of interest. Table 4 has to be interpreted as follows. The first and second
column show the variables shaping the interaction term, where the first column contains the
variable of interest for which the marginal effect is calculated. The second column shows the
conditioning variable. The third column displays the direct or individual effect for the variable
of interest, and the fourth column the corresponding coefficient of the interaction term with the
conditioning variable. Note that the median values for the remaining conditioning values are
taken for those variables of interest with more than one conditioning variable. The calculation is
carried out in accordance to the equations (6) and (7). The last column contains the threshold
level for the conditioning variable, i.e. the value at which the marginal effect of an increase of
the variable of interest changes its sign, given that all other relevant conditioning variables are
at their mean.
For most of the conditioning variables the threshold level is within the frontiers of actually
possible values. Only for 8 values which are written in italics in table 4, the threshold levels
are not in the range of possible values when the conditioning values are set to their mean.
This emphasizes the empirical relevance of interaction terms for shaping institutional charac-
teristics and conducting institutional reforms. Whether an institutional reform increases or
decreases unemployment depends on the level of the conditioning institution, given that the
other conditioning variables are at their mean.
5.2 Marginal effects of institutional reforms for selected countries
In principle, it is possible to calculate country-specific marginal effects for all institutional
indicators. Instead of using averaged data, calculations can be based on the indicator values for
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a specific country as well. Germany is used as an example to show exemplarily the economic
content of the results presented in this paper. First of all, the country specific descriptive
statistics for the individual institutions are required. The indicator values are presented in
table 5.
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Germany
Variable Mean Median S.D. Min Max
Payroll tax (TX1) 14.31 14.98 1.41 12.31 16.07
Income tax (TX2) 17.18 17.34 0.72 15.55 18.23
Consumption tax (TX3) 16.79 17.15 1.34 14.74 18.54
Employment protection regular (EPL1) 2.66 2.68 0.12 2.58 3.00
Employment protection temp (EPL2) 2.96 3.63 1.00 1.25 3.75
Bargaining coordination (BCO) 4.00 4.00 0.00 4.00 4.00
Minimum wage (MW) 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Union coverage (UC) 69.32 69.20 5.20 63.00 76.80
Entry barriers (EB) 3.77 4.15 1.72 0.77 5.71
Public ownership (POS) 3.52 3.94 1.06 1.86 4.67
First year benefits (UB1) 38.09 38.35 1.43 35.40 40.40
Second/third year benefits (UB2) 22.01 23.10 4.81 0.00 24.40
Fourth/fifth year benefits (UB3) 22.01 23.10 4.81 0.00 24.40
Averages over the period from 1982 to 2005 for Germany.
With the descriptive statistics for Germany, the calculations can be carried out with the
mean value over time as well as with the 2005 values, both for Germany. The results on the
impact of institutional changes enable to draw a clear picture of which institutional reforms
might be beneficial for the german labor market. Table 6 presents these marginal effects.
A positive value of the marginal effect means that an increase in the particular indicator
raises the unemployment rate. For the mean value, 6 indicators have a positive and 7 indicators
a negative sign. If only the indicator values for 2005 are used, the results change slightly. While
increases of the consumption tax (TX3) as well as the entry barriers (EB) show a negative
marginal effect on unemployment for the mean institutional values, it becomes positive for the
values for 2005. In contrast, the positive sign of the second and third year benefits (UB2) for
the mean values changes to a negative one for the 2005 values.
23
Table 6: Marginal effects for Germany for different values
Variable
Mean
value
Marginal
effect
(mean)
2005
value
Marginal
effect
(2005)
Payroll tax (TX1) 14.31 0.04430 15.29 0.02305
Income tax (TX2) 17.18 0.02106 15.70 0.02370
Consumption tax (TX3) 16.79 -0.02419 18.54 0.00045
Employment protection regular (EPL1) 2.66 0.10824 3.00 0.27893
Employment protection temp (EPL2) 2.96 -0.21996 1.25 -0.24680
Bargaining coordination (BCO) 4.00 -0.03661 4.00 -0.04944
Minimum wage MW) 1.00 -0.02330 1.00 -0.09236
Union coverage (UC) 69.32 -0.00697 63.00 -0.01767
Entry barriers (EB) 3.77 -0.03208 0.77 0.01983
Public ownership (POS) 3.52 0.09115 1.86 0.33493
First year benefits (UB1) 38.09 -0.00222 39.87 -0.00349
Second/third year benefits (UB2) 22.01 0.00283 0.00 -0.01181
Fourth/fifth year benefits (UB3) 22.01 0.00165 0.00 0.01939
Institutional marginal effects for Germany according to equation (12).
It is likely that the marginal effects of two countries with substantially distinct institutional
systems show even more heterogeneity. This exercise is carried out in the following. In order to
facilitate the comparison of similar reforms in institutionally different countries, marginal effects
are also calculated for France, the United States, Japan, and Sweden. For all 4 countries, only
the values for 2005 are taken since the construction of mean values might cause the negligence
of valuable information. The tables 7 and 8 display the marginal effects for all indicators for
France and the United States in table 7, and Japan and Sweden in table 8.
This overview again emphasizes the importance of country-specific institutional character-
istics for the overall effect of institutional indicators. For instance, the income tax (TX2) level
in France and the United States is largely comparable with values of roughly 14 and 13 %.
However, the impact of an increase in the income tax on the unemployment rate is completely
different. While an increase in the income tax in France increases the unemployment rate, the
effect goes in the opposite direction for the United States. According to table 4, the impact
of an income tax change depends on the payroll tax (TX1) and on the minimum wage (MW ).
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Table 7: Marginal effects for France and the United States
France United States
Variable
2005
value
Marginal
effect
2005
value
Marginal
effect
Payroll tax (TX1) 26.73 -0.01301 6.41 -0.03968
Income tax (TX2) 14.32 0.02827 13.28 -0.03719
Consumption tax (TX3) 24.62 0.01457 9.99 0.04272
Employment protection regular (EPL1) 2.47 -0.22195 0.17 0.85993
Employment protection temp (EPL2) 3.63 0.09300 0.25 0.05248
Bargaining coordination (BCO) 2.00 0.01552 1.00 -0.14952
Minimum wage (MW) 6.00 -0.05237 8.00 -0.09246
Union coverage (UC) 95.00 -0.01772 13.70 0.01091
Entry barriers (EB) 1.40 0.04426 1.68 0.04334
Public ownership (POS) 3.94 0.25108 1.40 0.31214
First year benefits (UB1) 60.78 -0.00151 29.45 0.00711
Second/third year benefits (UB2) 37.49 -0.00237 5.56 -0.01071
Fourth/fifth year benefits (UB3) 17.79 0.00697 5.56 0.01968
Institutional marginal effects for France and the United States according to equation (12).
Both countries have rather rigid minimum wage settings for which reason the payroll tax is the
crucial factor. France with a value of 27 % has a much higher payroll tax level than the United
States with about 6 %. Similarly, the impact of an increase in the bargaining coordination
(BCO) has a distinct impact in Sweden and in Japan although the degree of coordination is
the same. Again, the variation in the conditioning variable between both countries, the union
coverage (UC) which is at 92 % in Sweden and at about 16 % in Japan, delivers the explanation
for this effect. Another interesting point is the connection between the employment protection
and the unemployment benefits. Table 4 shows that the impact of the first year benefits (UB1)
only depends on the employment protection for regular employment (EPL1). The interplay
between both variables, the unemployment benefits as well as the degree of employment pro-
tection, has been emphasized in the literature (see Blanchard and Tirole 2008). A look at
the tables 7 and 8 points out the distinct effect of an employment protection reform in countries
with different levels of first year unemployment benefits. While an increase in the employment
protection for regular employment in France and in Sweden (with benefit levels of roughly 60
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Table 8: Marginal effects for Japan and Sweden
Japan Sweden
Variable
2005
value
Marginal
effect
2005
value
Marginal
effect
Payroll tax (TX1) 0.01 -0.07722 23.34 0.02578
Income tax (TX2) 0.01 -0.05448 14.22 0.04545
Consumption tax (TX3) 13.90 0.04466 31.66 0.00019
Employment protection regular (EPL1) 1.87 0.83447 2.86 -0.17206
Employment protection temp (EPL2) 1.00 0.00427 1.63 -0.21923
Bargaining coordination (BCO) 3.00 -0.14401 3.00 0.00943
Minimum wage (MW) 8.00 0.08117 1.00 -0.04681
Union coverage (UC) 16.41 -0.00310 92.00 -0.02190
Entry barriers (EB) 1.84 -0.00632 0.51 -0.02307
Public ownership (POS) 1.47 0.28044 3.40 0.33928
First year benefits (UB1) 22.32 0.00074 74.99 -0.00297
Second/third year benefits (UB2) 0.00 -0.00336 3.09 -0.01948
Fourth/fifth year benefits (UB3) 0.00 0.00846 0.00 0.01943
Institutional marginal effects for Japan and Sweden according to equation (12).
and 75 %) are linked to a fall in the unemployment rate, the same kind of reform increases
unemployment in the United States and Japan (with benefit levels of roughly 30 and 22 %).
5.3 Economic significance and heterogeneity over countries
In order to check whether the results are economically significant, a closer look is taken at the
fourth and fifth column of table 6 which contains the marginal effects for all 14 institutional
indicators for Germany. The values for all conditioning variables are the observations for 2005.
For the interpretation of coefficients it has to be taken into account that the unemployment
rate has been divided by 10 for all estimations due to computational reasons. A look at
table 6 points out that most of the coefficients are not only statistically but also economically
significant. For instance, an increase in the payroll tax (TX1) by 1 percentage point increases
the unemployment rate by 0.23 percentage points. An increase in the employment protection
for regular employment (EPL1) by one unit, i.e. from 2 to 3, for example, increases the
unemployment rate by roughly 2.7 percentage points. In contrast, a 1 percentage point increase
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in the employment protection for temporary employment (EPL2) lowers the unemployment rate
by about 2.4 percentage points. The impact of a reform of the unemployment benefit system
is relevant as well. An increase by 1 percentage point in the first (UB1), and the second and
third year benefits (UB2) lowers the unemployment rate by 0.03 and 0.12 percentage points,
respectively. In contrast, raising the fourth and fifth year benefits (UB3) by 1 percentage point
increases the unemployment rate by 0.19 percentage points. Interestingly, the product market
still seems to be over-regulated. A competition-enhancing reform of the public ownership (POS)
as well as the entry barriers (EB) would result in a lower unemployment rate in Germany. The
minimum wage (MW) as well as the bargaining coordination (BCO) results should be taken with
care. Both measures are just indexes that can take 8 and 6 values, respectively, and are rather
crude measures. Furthermore, the minimum wage index says nothing about the level of the
minimum wage. Yet, information on the level is crucial for a reasonable quantitative assessment
of its labor market effect.6 In this sense, the beneficial minimum wage effect is contradictory to
most empirical microeconomic studies summarized by Neumark and Wascher (2006) what
seems to underline the shortcoming of minimum wage indicators used in the macroeconomic
literature.7
The heterogeneity in the institutional impact is present for most of the indicators. Excep-
tions are the consumption tax (TX3) and the second and third year benefits with a negative
coefficient, and the public ownership (POS) with a positive coefficient for all five countries. Nev-
ertheless, the calculation of marginal effects for some more countries also shows heterogeneity
for these factors as well.
6The OECD provides a measure for the minimum wage relative to the average of full-time workers. Unfor-
tunately, the series are not comprehensively available for the period and countries included in this study.
7Recently, Dube et al. (2010) found a positive employment effect through an minimum wage increase in
restaurants and other low-wage sectors by exploiting a more comprehensive data-set. Whether this result holds
true only for the United States and the specific sectors or whether it can also be applied to other countries and
sectors is still unclear.
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6 Conclusions
The identification of robust and significant bivariate interaction terms between individual in-
stitutions is carried out with the help of a bayesian model averaging approach. 91 institutional
interactions consisting of bivariate combinations of 14 institutional indicators are tested for
significance. Overall, 22 interaction terms robustly contribute to the explanation of the unem-
ployment rate for 17 OECD countries from 1982 to 2005.
Except for the unemployment benefit coverage (UBC), all remaining 13 indicators are in-
volved in at least one interaction term. The central institutional indicators seem to be the
payroll tax, the entry barriers, and the minimum wage setting which take part in 5 interaction
terms. Using the observations for 2005 for Germany, France, the United States, Japan, and
Sweden, it is shown that similar reforms can have different effects on the labor market due to
the dependence on other institutional factors.
The results imply that institutional reforms conditional on the institutional system are
qualitatively as well as quantitatively important and can significantly contribute to reduce the
unemployment rate. The findings are beneficial for policy-making by delivering a fundament
for the macroeconomic ex ante evaluation of institutional reform decisions conditional on the
institutional arrangement.
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